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MIRANDA WARNINGS AND THE HARMLESS ERROR
DOCTRINE: COMMENTS ON THE INDIANA APPROACH
The Indiana Supreme Court in both Greer v. State' and Vasquez
v. State,2 assuming arguendo that certain statements had been admitted
into evidence in violation of Miranda v. Arizona,' held the admissions
harmless. Neither of the Indiana opinions reflects the controversy over
the propriety of applying harmless error rules to Miranda violations which
has led other courts to lengthy justifications.4 These opinions also fail to
establish fully the criteria to be used in future decisions. This note will
attempt to explain the principles underlying application of harmless error
rules to Miranda violations and to evaluate the standards developed thus
far by the Indiana Supreme Court.
THE PRINCIPLES BEHIND HARMLESS ERROR
The harmless error doctrine became widespread in the United
States in the early part of this century. In most states harmless error
statutes were passed in reaction to the effects perceived to have followed
from the automatic reversal rules which prevailed up to that time.' Pro-
ponents of these statutes argued that automatic reversal for error had
made the law appear a quagmire of technicality and delay, thereby under-
mining confidence in the judicial system among the public. It was urged
that automatic reversal also rewarded "sharp practices" of error manipula-
tion among lawyers.6 Harmless error rules were instituted to promote
1. 252 Ind. 20, 245 N.E.2d 158 (1969).
2. - Ind. -, 260 N.E.2d 779 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1012 (1971).
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4. See, e.g., Guyette v. State, 84 Nev. 160, 166-68, 438 P.2d 244, 248-49 (1968);
Commonwealth v. Padgett, 428 Pa. 229, 232-36, 237 A.2d 209, 211-12 (1968).
5. The present Indiana statute is typical of the wording of most harmless error
statutes:
In consideration of questions which are presented upon an appeal, the court
shall not regard technical errors or defects, or exceptions to any decision or
action of the trial court, which did not, in the opinion of the court to which
the appeal is taken, prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant.
IND. CODE § 35-1-47-9 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2320 (1956). Indiana, however,
passed harmless error statutes much earlier than many states and affirmed criminal con-
victions in spite of error throughout the last half of the nineteenth century. [1852]2 Ind.
Rev. Stat. 382-83; Smith v. State, 28 Ind. 321 (1867); Rollins v. State, 62 Ind. 46
(1878).
6. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 758-60 (1946) ; 1 3. WIGMORE, EvI-
DExcE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 21, at 370-76 (3d ed. 1940) ; Gibbs, Prejudicial Er-
ror: Admissions and Exclusions of Evidence in the Federal Courts, 3 VILL. L. Rxv. 48,
49-50 (1957).
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efficient allocation of judicial resources. It was thought that needless ex-
pensive retrials could be avoided by presumably less costly appellate exam-
ination of potential harm.' None of these statutes, however, made any dis-
tinction between constitutional and non-constitutional errors,8 and under
their mandate many state courts found constitutional errors to be
harmless.9
In 1967 the United States Supreme Court, in Chapman v. Cali-
fornia,"° held that the harmless error standard applicable in state courts to
federal constitutional errors was a matter of federal law."1 The Court then
announced the rule to be applied: the beneficiary of a constitutional
error must satisfy the reviewing court that the error was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. 2 The criterion by which the prejudice caused by an
error is to be judged is the effect which the error had upon the jury at
the trial considered in its entirety." As more fully explained by Mr.
Justice Rutledge in Kotteakos v. United States: 4
7. R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 14 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
TRAYNOR]; Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implications of Chapman v.
California, 53 MINN. L. REv. 519, 520 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Mause].
8. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).
9. The Indiana Supreme Court indicated its standard for harmless constitutional
error in Batchelor v. State, 189 Ind. 69, 125 N.E. 773 (1920) :
Where it appears on appeal from a judgment of conviction in a criminal case
that the defendant has been denied a right guaranteed by the Constitution, such
showing requires a reversal, unless the record clearly shows that the right was
waived or that no injury could have resulted to the accused by reason of such
denial.
Id. at 78-79, 125 N.E. at 776.
Cf. Van Tornhaut v. State, 199 Ind. 481, 157 N.E. 100 (1927) (admission of ille-
gally seized evidence found harmless) ; Bloom v. State, 155 Ind. 292, 58 N.E. 81 (1900)
(coerced admission found harmless).
10. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
11. Id. at 21. State rules remain applicable to errors of state law or procedure.
12. Id. at 24. The Indiana Supreme Court defined the reasonable doubt standard
in Greer:
It requires the trier of the facts to be so convinced by the evidence that as a
prudent man he would feel safe to act upon such conviction in matters of the
highest concern and importance to his own nearest, dearest and most important
interests in circumstances where there was no compulsion or coercion to act at all.
252 Ind. at 30, 245 N.E.2d at 163-64.
13. 386 U.S. at 23-24, 25-26. "Jury" is being used here to designate the fact finder
at the trial, whether actually a jury or a judge. The rules of evidence are applicable to
trials before both jury and judge, Thomas v. State, 237 Ind. 537, 147 N.E.2d 577 (1958),
presumably because it is assumed that their reactions to admitted evidence will be the
same. A similar rule should govern harmless error judgments, which are based on
determinations of evidentiary impact. Data from the University of Chicago Jury Proj-
ect showed no consistent differences in the way judges and juries evaluate repudiated
confessions. H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 172-74 (1966) [here-
inafter cited as KALVEN]. "Jury" shall be used throughout this note to include judges
acting as fact-finders unless a distinction is specifically made. See notes 56 and 74 infra.
14. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
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[T]he question is not were [the jurors] right in their judg-
ment, regardless of the error or its effect upon the verdict. It is
rather what effect the error had or reasonably may be taken to
have had upon the jury's decision. The crucial thing is the
impact of the thing done wrong on the minds of other men, not
on one's own in the total settihg.
. . . The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough
to support the result, apart from the phase affected by the error.
It is rather, even so, whether the error itself had substantial
influence. If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction
cannot stand.1"
Under the federal standard an error cannot be harmless unless there is
no reasonable possibility that it contributed to the conviction."
15. Id. at 764, 765. See also Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969):
We of course do not know the jurors who sat. Our judgment must be based on
our own reading of the record and what seems to us to have been the probable
impact of the two confessions on the minds of an average jury.
16. Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963). The effect upon this federal
harmless error standard of Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969), has been a
matter of some controversy. That case involved admission at a joint trial of incriminat-
ing confessions of Harrington's co-defendants, in violation of Bruton v. United States,
391 U. S. 123 (1968). Justice Douglas, for the majority, said that apart from the con-
fessions the case against Harrington was so overwhelming that the violation of Bruton
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 395 U.S. at 254. Justice Brennan, in a dissent
joined in by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Marshall, charged that the holding effec-
tively overruled Chapman by changing the focus from the effect of the error to the
amount of untainted evidence. Id. at 255.
In spite of the majority's express reaffirmation of Chapman, Harrington has been
interpreted by some commentators as a retreat from the stringency of the "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" standard. See TRAYmOR, supra note 7, at 45-46; Note, Applicationr of the
Harmless Error Doctrine to Violations of Miranda: The California Experience, 69
MIcH. L. Ry. 941, 944 (1971). The controversy may be merely a battle over labels re-
flecting the inadequacy of one verbal formula for capturing the same standard of subjec-
tive certainty in all persons. Different people may have different thresholds of doubt
which can lead to different results in any decision in spite of agreement on the criteria.
See KALvEN, supra note 13, at 182-90. Chief Justice Traynor may find only "highly
probable" what Justice Douglas finds "beyond a reasonable doubt," although both agree
that sufficient certainty is present to affirm.
More fundamentally, however, Harrington'r use of overwhelming evidence can be
seen as a means of determining the likelihood that any piece of evidence contributed to
a verdict. For harmless error purposes the trial is to be examined in its entirety. The
underlying theory is that the jury does not decide the case until all evidence has been
presented. Then, from the total record it is assumed that the jury rationally relies upon
the most direct and persuasive evidence to decide an issue and retreats to more remote
and less credible evidence only if it is needed to meet strong evidence on the other side.
If the evidence against the defendant is overwhelming, the jury needs only the best evi-
dence to resolve its doubts. The weaker the character and quality of the tainted evi-
dence relative to other evidence on the issue, the more probable the jury was able to and
did ignore it in reaching the verdict. Under this model the issue is not whether there
is overwhelming evidence to convict, but rather whether there is overwhelming evidence
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Although Chapman articulated the federal standard to be used,
it left open the scope of the standard's application. The Court held that
some constitutional errors may be harmless in particular cases, but it also
noted that "there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial
that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error."" Chapman
did not, however, expressly overrule the Court's prior practice of granting
reversals for certain constitutional errors without examination for pre-
judice or with comment that lack of prejudice would be irrelevant. 8
Therefore, the applicability of the federal harmless error rule to errors
not decided19 or noted" in Chapman remains uncertain until resolved
in later cases."' Thus far the Court has not decided the question of
harmless error in violations of Miranda.22
Once it has been decided that a certain type of constitutional error
falls within the scope of the Chapman rule there remains the task of
of a quality better than that erroneously admitted. The majority and dissent in Harring-
ton essentially disagreed about the value of the eyewitness testimony which would remain
in the prosecution's case if the illegally used confessions were ignored. Later cases citing
Harrington can be explained by the same model. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S.
42 (1970) ; Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 90 (1970) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Whatever may be the difficulties in scaling evidence values under the overwhelming
evidence model suggested, it is plain that out-of-court statements of the defendant, as a
class, will be near the very highest. The existence of better or equally probative evidence
in the record will be rare. Thus, harmless error findings are limited to cases in which
this superior evidence is present.
17. 386 U.S. at 23. The Court gave three examples: coerced confession, Payne v.
Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) ; right to counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) ; and impartial judge, Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
18. See Mr. Justice Stewart's list of prior decisions of automatic reversal in his
concurring opinion in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 42-44 (1967).
19. Chapman applied the new harmless error rule to a violation of the rule estab-
lished in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (comment on defendant's failure to
testify unconstitutional), finding the error prejudicial in that case. See note 33 infra.
20. See note 17 supra.
21. Since Chapman, the Supreme Court has approved application of the harmless
error rule to: denial of counsel at pretrial identifications, United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967) (remanded) ; Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969) (remanded) ;
use of constitutionally invalid conviction to increase sentence, Burgett v. Texas, 389
U.S. 109 (1967) (held prejudicial); comment on defendant's failure to testify, Ander-
son v. Nelson, 390 U.S. 523 (1968) (held prejudicial) and Fontaine v. California, 390
U.S. 593 (1968) (held prejudicial); admission of illegally seized evidence, Bumper v.
North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (held prejudicial) and Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42 (1970) (held harmless) ; admission of co-defendant's out of court confession,
Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969) (held harmless) ; retrial violating double
jeopardy, Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970) (held prejudicial) ; denial of counsel at
preliminary hearing, Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (held prejudicial).,
22. In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), the majority held that use for
impeachment purposes of statements taken without Miranda warnings was not a violation
of Miranda. Dissenting Justices Brennan, Douglas and Marshall, finding constitutional
error, argued that the error was not harmless under the Chapman standard. No argument
for automatic reversal was made. Id. at 229 n.2.
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developing criteria to ascertain the potential impact of the error on the
jury. It is doubtful that the Court can or will undertake comprehensive
supervision of this phase of the application of the federal standard.2"
Harmless error determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis,
analyzing the total record of each trial. The inability of the Court to
undertake a burden of this type has led some judges and commentators to
suggest automatic reversal as the only feasible means to assure protection
of defendants' rights.24 Such an approach, which would foreclose the
states from furthering their own judicial economy policies, was implicitly
rejected by the majority in Chapman.2" The Court realistically responded
to its limited capacity to review these questions with a willingness to rely
upon the ability of state appellate courts to apply the law in good faith.26
Therefore, the responsibility for defining the relevant criteria for ascertain-
ing the impact on the jury of each type of constitutional error will remain
with the state appellate courts.2
MIRANDA POLICIES AND HARMLESS ERROR
In Miranda the Court held that no statements of a defendant made
during custodial interrogation could be admitted into evidence unless the
prosecution demonstrates that procedural safeguards to secure the defen-
dant's privilege against self-incrimination have been utilized. The Court
announced that prior to any questioning the suspect must be warned that
he has the right to remain silent, that any statement he makes may be
23. The Supreme Court may have reviewed enough violations of Griffin v. Cali-
fornia, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (unconstitutional comment on a defendant's failure to tes-
tify), to be able to develop some crude criteria. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18 (1967) ; Anderson v. Nelson, 390 U.S. 523 (1968) ; Fontaine v. California, 390 U.S.
593 (1968) ; Ross v. California, 391 U.S. 470 (1968), rev'g inem., People v. Ross, 67
Cal.2d 64, 429 P.2d 606, 60 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1967). Such repeated exposure has not been
duplicated with other types of error.
24. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 45 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring);
Mause, supra note 7, at 536.
25. Presumably a state supreme court can still practice automatic reversal after
Chapman if it finds that procedure more economical for its own judicial system.
26. Note, A Coninent on Application of the Harmless Constitutional Error Rile to
"Confessionz" Cases, 1968 UTAr L. Rav. 144, 151. See also Foster v. California, 394 U.S.
440, 452 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting) :
To say the least, the question whether an error in a particular case is harmless
is an issue peculiarly for lower, not for the highest, appellate courts. Then,
too, this issue can usually be tried more efficiently, and just as fairly by the
local court that tried the case or by the local appellate court that heard the
first appeal. This Court was not established to try such minor issues of fact
for the first time.
27. The Supreme Court has adopted a policy of refusing to rule upon questions of
harmless error in the first instance and remanding to state appellate courts for deter-
mination. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969).
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used against him and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
retained or appointed, during the questioning. A suspect may waive these
rights if the waiver is made voluntarily and intelligently, but if he
indicates at any time that he wishes the interrogation to cease or an
attorney to be present, the police may no longer question him.2" To
determine whether the Court in Miranda established one of those "con-
stitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be
treated as harmless error," 9 the goals of Miranda must be examined.
One goal which seems basic to a fair trial is the exclusion of unreli-
able evidence which might be obtained through coercion."0 Miranda
accomplishes this goal since such statements presumably will not be pre-
ceded by the standardized warnings and waiver.3 Application of a
harmless error rule would not, however, undercut Miranda as a reliability
safeguard, but would merely allow an appellate court to conclude that an
error did not produce the feared result. It is only when a statement of
questionable reliability has an effect upon the jury that a concern for
the integrity of the guilt-determination process requires reversal. An
appellate court finding that the admission of a certain statement was harm-
less is, under Chapman, a declaration that beyond a reasonable doubt that
statement played no part in the jury's determination of guilt. This finding
is logically independent from any conclusion about the statement's re-
liability. 2 Regardless of their reliability, statements which have an effect
28. 384 U.S. at 444-45.
29. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967).
30. 384 U.S. at 455 n.24: "Interrogation procedures may even give rise to a false
confession."
31. The fact that Miranda was not applied retroactively, Johnson v. New Jersey,
384 U.S. 719 (1966), may indicate that the Court did not think noncompliance with the
newly required warnings created a significant fault in the fact-finding process. The
Court relied on the adequacy of previous voluntariness tests to provide protection in
those caess to which Miranda did not apply. Some courts have taken the nonretro-
activity of Miranda as an indication that the harmless error rule is applicable. Guyette
v. State, 84 Nev. 160, 166-67, 438 P.2d 244, 248 (1968) ; Commonwealth v. Padgett, 428
Pa. 229, 234-35, 237 A.2d 209, 212 (1968).
Although the effect of an error on the fact-finding process is a relevant factor in
decisions concerning both automatic reversal and retroactivity, the degree of potential
unreliability introduced by noncompliance is balanced against different costs in each
decision so that the criteria may not overlap exactly. Mause, supra note 7, at 549 n.191.
In Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969), the Supreme Court held harmless
a violation of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (illegal use of co-defend-
ant's confession), although Bruton had been applied retroactively in Roberts v. Russell,
392 U.S. 293 (1968). This example indicates that application of harmless error rules is
not limited to decisions which have been applied only prospectively.
32. At least one state court has attempted to apply harmless error rules only to
Miranda violations which produce statements that would have been voluntary under the
tests employed prior to Miranda. Commonwealth v. Padgett, 428 Pa. 229, 237 A.2d 209
(1968). The distinction is probably a result of the need to reconcile the logic of the
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on the jury will be cause for reversal under the federal harmless error
rule. Based upon an unreliability rationale, therefore, Miranda errors fail
to qualify for automatic reversal if violations do not automatically have
an effect on the jury.8"
A second goal of Miranda is the deterrence of obnoxious and brutal
police practices used to extort confessions, although again this effect is
achieved because statements produced by such methods are within the
much wider class of statements rendered inadmissible. 4 Theoretically,
the exclusion of evidence obtained by "third degree" techniques eliminates
any incentive for such illegal activity. In this respect Miranda anticipated
the same effect on police conduct as was to be achieved by the exclusionary
rule announced in Mapp v. Ohio"8 and, therefore, is subject to much of
the same criticism that Mapp has received. 6
There seems to be general agreement that a harmless error rule
consistently applied too liberally or in bad faith can do much to undercut
the deterrent effectiveness of exclusionary rules such as Mapp and
application of harmless error rules to Miranda with the inclusion of coerced confessions
in Chapman's list of automatic reversal errors. That contradiction can be resolved by a
showing that the inclusion of coerced confessions was erroneous. See note 33 infra.
The application of separate rules has been criticized as forcing reversion to the time-
consuming case-by-case analysis of voluntariness that Miranda was intended to replace.
Mause, supra note 7, at 550. A more fundamental criticism is that the voluntary-involun-
tary distinction has nothing to do with the criterion for harmless error: effect on the
jury. People v. Schader, 62 Cal.2d 716, 730, 401 P.2d 665, 674, 44 Cal. Rptr. 193, 202
(1965).
33. The inclusion of Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958), in the class of auto-
matic reversal errors in Chapman presents a difficulty under this analysis. The same
reasoning about lack of jury effect should apply as well to coerced confessions. Perhaps
the explanation lies in the Court's failure to visualize those rare circumstances in which
a confession may have little impact on the jury. See text accompanying note 67 infra.
The Court's decision on the facts of Chapman shows that it could not have been us-
ing an unreliable evidence rationale in classifying automatic reversal errors. The de-
fendants in that case claimed error in comments made by the prosecutor and trial judge
about their failure to testify. This practice had been declared unconstitutional in Griffin
v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), in part because the inference of guilt from silence
made permissible by such comments was untrustworthy. Id. at 614-15. The Court in
Chapman held that the harmless error rule was applicable to Griffin violations.
34. 384 U.S. at 447:
Unless a proper limitation upon custodial interrogation is achieved-such as
these decisions will advance-there can be no assurance that practices of this
nature [the "third degree"] will be eradicated in the foreseeable future.
The Court excluded the confessions in Miranda in spite of the absence of "overt
physical coercion or patent psychological ploys." Id. at 457. The police conduct was
evidently not repugnant to due process because the statements might well have been
voluntary in traditional terms.
35. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
36. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
412-22 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ; Oaks, Studying the E.chsionary Rule in
Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. R-v. 665 (1970).
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Miranda." But there is no reason to believe that a harmless error rule
as narrowly drawn as that in Chapman and applied in good faith should
change police expectations about the results of misconduct. A conviction
will be secured in spite of misconduct only when a trial judge admits the
evidence and the highest state court finds that, examining the trial as a
whole, the error was harmless. No police force could rationally plan to
evade constitutional norms and secure convictions on the basis of these
unpredictable events." Also, a finding that an error was harmless is a
declaration that the evidence played no significant role in the verdict and,
therefore, the conviction cannot be seen as a reward for misconduct."
The Court has applied the federal harmless error rule to violations of
Map p40 and, therefore, there seems to be no basis in the deterrence
rationale for denying its applicability to Miranda.
The third and most important goal of Miranda is the translation
into working guidelines of the exclusionary rule already present in the
fifth amendment.' The Court sought to perform this function by defining
"compulsion" with reference to broad and historic principles of proper
"state-individual balance ' ' 42 rather than merely in response to the particu-
lar preventable evils presented by the unreliability and deterrence
rationales. Because of its fifth amendment base, the Miranda exclusionary
rule differs from the one announced in Mapp. The search and seizure
exclusionary rule is not expressed in the Constitution and is aimed at
37. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 50-51 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 255 (1969) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ; Thomp-
son, Unconstitutional Search and Seiure and the Myth of Harmless Error, 42 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 457, 462 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Thompson].
38. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 560 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting);
Mause, supra note 7, at 552.
39. See People v. Parham, 60 Cal.2d 378, 386, 384 P.2d 1001, 1005, 33 Cal. Rptr.
497, 501 (1963) (per Traynor, C.J.).
40. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (held harmless) ; Bumper v. North
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (held prejudicial). See also Crim v. State, - Ind.
272 N.E.2d 85 (1971) (held harmless) ; Peterson v. State, 250 Ind. 269, 274, 234 N.E.2d
488, 491 (1968) (dictum).
41. No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself....
42. All these policies point to one overriding thought: the constitutional foun-
dation underlying the privilege [against self-incrimination] is the respect a gov-
ernment-state or federal-must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citi-
zens. To maintain a "fair state-individual balance," to require the government
"to shoulder the entire load," . . . to respect the inviolability of the human
personality, our accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the govern-
ment seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its
own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling
it from his own mouth.
384 U.S. at 460.
MIRANDA WARNINGS
preventing violations of the fourth amendment. These violations are
complete in themselves irrespective of any criminal prosecutions. The
fifth amendment, on the other hand, is not violated at the moment police
compel a suspect to speak, but only when his compelled speech is used
against him.43 Miranda appears, therefore, to be basic to a fair trial
because it seeks to prevent violations of the fifth amendment.
Exemption from the harmless error rule for errors based on the
fifth amendment was, however, implicitly rejected by Chapman itself.
The defendants in that case claimed that the prosecutor's comment upon
their failure to testify had violated their rights under the fifth amendment
as interpreted by Griffin v. California.44 Although the Court agreed that
by their silence in face of the comments the defendants "had served as
irrefutable witnesses against themselves,"45 it rejected automatic reversal
and proceeded to examine for prejudicial impact."'
In summary, an examination of Miranda and its foundations
indicates that a harmless error judgment under the Chapman standard of
certainty should not be precluded. Also evident, however, is the import-
ance of accuracy in the application of harmless error standards to avoid
undermining the integrity of the guilt-determination process, the judicial
supervison of police conduct and the constitutional limitations imposed on
the government by the fifth amendment.
Having decided that Miranda errors as a class should not be
exempted from application of the federal harmless error standard,
appellate courts must decide the criteria to be used in determining the
effect of any particular Miranda error on the jury. It is suggested that
Miranda errors can be harmless in either or both of two ways. First, the
content of an erroneously admitted statement may have had so little
inferential value that, even if believed by the jury, the statement cannot
be said to have contributed to a conviction. Second, a statement even
43. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 683-85 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ; People
v. Varnum, 66 Cal.2d 808, 427 P.2d 772, 59 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
529 (1968).
44. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
45. 386 U.S. at 25.
46. It might also be argued that a defendant does not become "a witness against
himself," unless his compelled statements play a part in causing infliction of a criminal
penalty. Under this interpretation the fifth amendment is not violated if the defendant's
statements are ignored by the jury, any more than when they are excluded from evi-
dence. Preventive procedural rules such as Miranda and Griffin are properly based on
the assumption that most evidence of this type is not ignored. If, however, an appellate
court finds in retrospect that a Mirotda error did not lead to an effect on the jury, then
the trial has been fair by fifth amendment standards and the error should be held harm-
less.
339
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if inferentially significant, may not have had any impact on the jury's
belief of its content. If an erroneously admitted statement has significant
content and measurable impact, the error should not be held harmless.
HARMLESS CONTENT
The possibility that the content of an erroneously admitted state-
ment may make its admission harmless arises because the Miranda
exclusionary rule has broad application:
The warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance
with our opinion today are, in the absence of a fully effective
equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement
made by a defendant. No distinction can be drawn between
statements which are direct confessions and statements which
amount to "admissions" of part or all of an offense. The
privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from
being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner; it does
not distinguish degrees of incrimination. Similarly, for precisely
the same reason, no distinction may be drawn between in-
culpatory statements and statements alleged to be merely
"exculpatory."
Because of Miranda's breadth the required inquiry as to admissibility of
any statement will be made before the statement is heard by the jury
and without regard to its content. The statement which is eventually
admitted after an erroneous ruling may turn out to be one of several
varieties, each presenting potentially different harmless error problems.
One type of statement which might be admitted in violation of
Miranda is a denial by the defendant of any connection with the crime.
In theory these statements would never be used by the prosecution
since they do not imply guilt or affect credibility. Nevertheless, they oc-
casionally do enter the record, most often in descriptions of a defendant's
behavior upon arrest. In such cases the proper course of action for the
appellate court is to hold that such admission into evidence was error since
47. 384 U.S. at 476-77. Prior to Miranda, Indiana may have allowed involuntary
admissions to be admitted in evidence where confessions would not have been. Note,
Extrajudicial Criminal Confessions in Indiana: Changes in the Law of Admissibility, 41
IND. L.J. 107 (1965), citing Watts v. State, 229 Ind. 80, 95 N.E.2d 570 (1950). This dis-
crimination was permissible under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 162 n.5 (1953). However, the fifth amendment, ap-
plied to the states in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), had very early been inter-
preted to apply to any link in the chain of evidence to guilt. United States v. Burr, 25
F. Cas. 38 (No. 14, 692e) (C.C. Va. 1807) (per Marshall, C.J.).
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adequate warnings or waiver had not occurred. The error, however,
should be found to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the
content, even if believed, could in no way contribute to a conviction."8
Two recent Indiana cases have involved such exculpatory denials.
In Jones v. State49 and FuIks v. State ° the defendants claimed Miranda
errors, although neither had admitted connection with the crimes. The
Indiana Supreme Court affirmed both convictions holding that Miranda
was not applicable unless the defendants demonstrated harm from the
failure of the police to give adequate warnings."' This analysis violates
both Miranda, as to the scope of its application, and Chapman, as to
the burden of proof on harmless error.2 Although the conviction is
affirmed under both analyses the "error, but harmless" method suggested
previously better defines the separate issues involved and maintains
Miranda's focus on police conduct rather than content.
A second class of statements which might be admitted in violation
of Miranda lies at the other end of the inferential scale-confessions.
These have been traditionally defined as express acknowledgements of
guilt containing every element of the crime with which the defendant is
charged." There can be no doubt that confessions are so directly probative
of the guilt that they can never be held harmless on the basis of content
alone.
Between exculpatory denials and confessions, in terms of inferential
value, are admissions. These statements have some tendency to establish
guilt but are insufficient in themselves to authorize a conviction. 4
Statements in this broad category may vary significantly in the degree
of incrimination. It has been argued that since some logical contribution
to a conviction is always conceivable, admissions should never be held
harmless.55 Empirical studies indicate that it is extremely difficult to
identify which facts are most significant in the minds of jurors or which
48. See People v. Hillary, 62 Cal.2d 692, 401 P.2d 382, 44 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1965),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 938 (1967).
49. - Ind.- , 255 N.E.2d 219 (1970).
50. - Ind.-, 262 N.E.2d 651 (1970).
51. - Ind. at- , 255 N.E.2d at 221; - Ind. at- , 262 N.E.2d at 652. The
extent to which extra-judicial statements were used at the trials in these two cases is
unclear from the opinions. If no statements were admitted in evidence, the result reached
by the court is proper. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
52. See text accompanying note 12, supra.
53. 2 F. WARTON, WHARTON's CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §§ 336-37 (12th ed. 1955);
Slough, Confessions and Admissions, 28 FoRDHAm L. REV. 96 (1959).
54. 2 F. WHARTON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDEN cE §§ 337, 397 (12th ed. 1955);
Slough, Confessions and Admissions, 28 FoRDHAm L REV. 96 (1959).
55. Cf. Thompson, supra note 37, at 464.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
inferential routes they follow in arrivng at a verdict. 6 Also, since the
prosecution introduced an admission as part of its case, it could be estopped
from arguing on appeal that the statement played no part in the con-
victionY
A rigid rule precluding appellate courts from judging the inferential
value of a particular admission would, however, re-introduce the evils of
inflexibility which led to the adoption of harmless error statutes."8 Judges
at both trial and appellate levels are constantly called upon to decide
questions of relevancy and sufficiency of evidence. It would seem, there-
fore, that under the restraint of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard,
appellate courts should be allowed to find some admissions of remote or
minor facts harmless on the basis of content alone.5"
The Indiana Supreme Court faced such judgments about the
content of admissions in Greer" and Vasquez.61 In Greer an admission
by the defendant that she had previously beaten the infant victim was
entered in evidence at her trial for murder. Although the statement had
been used to prove only the malice element of the crime, the supreme court
did not base its harmless error finding on content (inferential remote-
ness). Rather the court found that the statement lacked significant impact
on the jury. 2 During police interrogation the defendant in Vasquez had
56. Cf. R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 133-44, 175 (1967) ;
Weld & Roff, A Study in the Formation of Opinion Based upon Legal Evidence, 51 Am.
J. PsYcH. 609, 625-28 (1938). It may be that an appellate court can insist upon a more
logical chain of inference from a judge than from a jury. See the comments of Judge
Friendly, refusing to extend to judges the right to give multiple inconsistent verdicts
which had been allowed to federal juries under the rule of Dunn v. United States. 284
U.S. 390 (1932), and accepted by Indiana in Flowers v. State, 221 Ind. 448, 48 N.E.2d 56
(1943) :
We do not believe we would enhance respect for law or for the courts by recog-
nizing for a judge the same right to indulge in "vagaries" in disposition of
criminal charges that, for historic reasons, has been granted the jury ...
We know the rule of logic in law is not unlimited; but "Holmes did not tell us
that logic is to be ignored when experience is silent." Since we find no ex-
perience to justify approval of an inconsistent judgment when a criminal case
is tried to a judge, we think logic should prevail.
United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899, 903 (2d Cir. 1960).
57. People v. Powell, 67 Cal.2d 32, 56-57, 429 P.2d 137, 151-52, 59 Cal. Rptr. 817,
831-32 (1967):
• . . [W]e have seen how important these statements were to the People's case,
and "There is no reason why we should treat this evidence as any less 'crucial'
than the prosecutor-and so presumably the jury-treated it."
Cf. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 541-42 (1897).
58. See notes 6-7 siepra & accompanying text.
59. See TRAYNOR, supra note 7, at 59.
60. 252 Ind. 20, 245 N.E.2d 158 (1969).
61. - Ind.-- , 260 N.E.2d 779 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1012 (1971).
62. 252 Ind. at 28-29, 245 N.E.2d at 163.
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described his activities and apparel on the night of the alleged rape. The
statements used at his trial contained exculpatory denials but also admitted
his presence in the vicinity of the crime and the wearing of clothing which
in part matched the description of the assailant. The court commented on
the general and non-confessional nature of the admissions but did not
find the error harmless on that basis. Rather, the presence of other
evidence of the same facts in the record was decisive, indicating a judg-
ment based on impact instead of content. 3
Given selection of evidence by the prosecution and rulings on
relevancy by the judge, it is unlikely that many admissions will ever be
so lacking in probative value as to be found harmless under the standard
of certainty required. The policies underlying harmless error, however,
require that the possibility of finding harmless content be left open for
those cases in which such a finding is appropriate. A statement by the
defendant entered in evidence in violation of Miranda should be found
harmless if beyond a reasonable doubt its content did not contribute to
the conviction. This will be the case only when the statement contains
exculpatory denials or insignificant factual admissions. In all other cases
the error should be held harmless only if the incriminating statement
failed to have a significant impact on the jury's belief of the facts con-
tained in the statement.04
HARMLESS IMPACT
Erroneous admission of incriminating statements made by a defen-
dant has traditionally been considered cause for automatic reversal on
appeal. The necessity for this practice in terms of the goals of Miranda has
been examined and rejected earlier. 5 One further argument for automatic
reversal in confession cases has been made purely in terms of harmless
error theory and retains general validity: the defendant's statement
has such an evidentiary impact on the jury that it can rarely be said to
have had no effect on the verdict. An incriminating statement by the
defendant has been called "an evidentiary bombshell which shatters the
defense."00 As the Indiana Supreme Court explained in Beck v. State:
63. - Ind. at- , 260 N.E.2d at 781-82.
64. Because the same test must be applied to both confessions and significant ad-
missions, both vill be subsumed under the term "confession" for purposes of the re-
mainder of this note.
65. See text accompanying notes 30-46 vupra.
66. People v. Schader, 62 CaI.2d 716, 731, 401 P.2d 665, 674, 44 Cal. Rptr. 193, 202
(1965). The University of Chicago Jury Project found that the presence of a confession
in the prosecution's case before a jury dropped the acquittal rate to twenty-one per cent
from thirty per cent for other strong cases. KALvFN, supra note 13, at 160. The cor-
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Almost invariably a confession will constitute persuasive
evidence of guilt and it is therefore usually extremely difficult
to determine what part it played in securing the conviction even
though it is apparent that there is considerable evidence of guilt
in the case on appeal.67
Because a confession will have an impact on the jury's belief of
facts in an overwhelming majority of cases, it has been suggested that
judicial economy requires an automatic reversal rule be applied to such
statements."8 Since few convictions will be affirmed on grounds of
harmless impact, it has been argued that the amount of retrial time saved
would be less than the amount of appellate time spent in examination of
the impact in every case. This general abstract calculation, however, has
apparently been found unduly restrictive in practice by the several
appellate courts which have decided to make harmless error inquiries in
Miranda cases.69 Still, judicial economy will be furthered if appellate
courts can identify classes of cases in which Miranda error impact is
significantly minimized and limit examination to those cases.
The Indiana Supreme Court has found Miranda errors to be harm-
less in two situations. The first occurs when the jury has been instructed
not to give erroneously admitted statements any effect in arriving at their
verdict. In Davis v. State"0 the prosecution in rebuttal entered certain
statements, taken without adequate warnings, to challenge the defendant's
testimony that he did not remember his acts on the night of the crime.
The trial judge later reconsidered defense objections and instructed the
jury to disregard the statements. Affirming the conviction, the supreme
court found that, under Harris v. New York, 1 use of the statements
responding figures in trials before a judge were five per cent and fifteen per cent. Id. at
162.
67. 250 Ind. 276, 282, 235 N.E.2d 699, 703 (1968) [emphasis omitted], citing People
v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
937, 946 (1965). See also Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567-68 (1958).
68. Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 95 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ; People
v. Parham, 60 Cal.2d 378, 384 P.2d 1001, 33 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1963) (dictum), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 945 (1964) ; Mause, supra note 7, at 543-45.
69. See, e.g., Soolook v. State, 447 P.2d 55 (Alaska 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
850 (1969) ; People v. Landgham, 122 Ill. App. 2d 9, 257 N.E.2d 484 (1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 911 (1971); Guyette v. State, 84 Nev. 160, 438 P.2d 244 (1968) (inadequate
warnings given by Indiana police); Commonwealth v. Padgett, 428 Pa. 229, 237 A.2d
209 (1968). California, which had originally adopted an automatic reversal rule with
respect to confessions, later found that exceptions had to be created to obey the state's
harmless error statute. People v. Jacobson, 63 Cal.2d 319, 405 P.2d 555, 46 Cal. Rptr.
515 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1015 (1966).
70. - Ind.- , 271 N.E.2d 893 (1971).
71. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
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was not error and even if it had been error, "it is ordinarily sufficient in
law for the court to instruct the jury to disregard inadmissible evidence
which it has heard." In selecting the judge's instructions as an alternative
ground for its decision, the court implied that it might find such in-
structions adequate to cure Miranda errors even when statements were
used in the prosecution's case in chief.73
The normal rule that errors in the admission of evidence are pre-
sumed cured by instructions M is inappropriate when applied to confessions,
which have the "bombshell effect" described earlier." Courts have often
expressed skepticism of the jury's understanding and obedience of in-
structions to ignore prejudicial evidence of other types."6 Since the jury's
obedience of instructions cannot be known beyond a reasonable doubt,
Miranda errors should not be found harmless merely because instructions
to disregard the statements were given.
The second situation in which Indiana has found Miranda errors
harmless occurs when the defendant has testified to the same facts as
those contained in the erroneously admitted statements. This was the
pattern in both Greer and Vasquez. It seems logical to assume that when
a jury has heard and seen the defendant testify, statements with the samre
content previously reported second-hand will no longer play a part in
that jury's determinations.7 ' The defendant's incriminating testimony
72. - Ind at.- , 271 N.E.2d at 895.
73. See Merritt v. State, 245 Ind. 362, 198 N.E.2d 867 (1964) ; Temple v. State,
245 Ind. 21, 195 N.E.2d 850 (1964). In both cases statements of the defendant were
used in the prosecution's case, were objected to on grounds other than Miranda and
were found harmless because of judicial instructions to disregard.
74. Ward v. State, 246 Ind. 374, 205 N.E.2d 148 (1965) ; Ross v. State, 204 Ind.
281, 182 N.E. 865 (1933).
75. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
76. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967); White v. State, -Ind.-, 272 N.E.2d
312 (1971) (revelation of defendant's prior convictions) ; Bruton v. United States, 391
U.S. 123 (1968); Baniszewski v. State, - Ind.- , 261 N.E.2d 359 (1970) (use of
statements of co-defendants). See Krulewich v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring) :
The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions
to the jury . . . all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.
77. One empirical study indicates that instructions to disregard evidence may sensi-
tize the jury to it. Kalven, A Report on the Jury Project of the University of Chicago,
24 INs. COuNS. J. 368 (1957). Model juries witnessing civil trials in which evidence of
the defendant's insurance was objected to and instructions to disregard were given
awarded higher damages than juries which had not heard the evidence or had heard it
without objection. The author concludes that instructions kept the jury from talking
about insurance but made action on that basis more likely. Id. at 377-78. Judges, on
the other hand, gave the lowest awards in the objection-instruction cases. Id. at 380.
78. See Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 475-76 (1900).
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should act as a second and larger evidentiary "bombshell," obliterating
the effect of the initial error.
Mere presence of the defendant's testimony in the record, however,
is not sufficient to make the original error harmless. A further require-
ment has been imposed: the defendant's testimony must not have been
compelled by the erroneous admission of his out-of-court statements. The
Supreme Court has held that if a defendant testifies in order to overcome
the impact of a confession improperly admitted, his testimony is itself a
product of illegal compulsion and cannot be used against him. 9 The
Indiana Supreme Court adopted this reasoning in Greer:
This is not to say that constitutional error in the admission
of an incriminating statement of an accused is always and
automatically rendered harmless by the accused testifying con-
cerning the same facts that were in the statement. If the con-
stitutional error compels the defendant to take the stand in order
to deny or explain away the statement, or substantially restricts
the choice of tactics by the defendant's counsel in presenting his
defense, then we would not say the error was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.80
Although the directive of this rule is clear, the task of developing
methods to measure compulsion to testify remains."1 Three different
approaches have been suggested.
First, in Harrison v. United States, 2 the Supreme Court put the
burden of proving the lack of compulsion on the prosecution:
[H]aving illegally placed his confessions before the jury,
79. Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968). Harrison involved use of the
defendant's testimonial admissions in a re-trial for the same offense. The connection of
the case with harmless error is evident, however, in the Court's reliance on a harmless
error case, People v. Spencer, 66 Cal.2d 158, 424 P.2d 715, 57 Cal. Rptr. 163 (1967).
The Court later vacated a harmless error judgment to be reconsidered in the light of
Harrison. McDaniel v. North Carolina, 392 U.S. 665 (1968), vacating mere. State v.
McDaniel, 272 N.C. 556, 158 S E.2d 874 (1968). The decision of the state court in
McDaniel was cited in Greer, 252 Ind. at 30. 245 N.E.2d at 164, as presenting a factual
situation similar to the one presented there.
80. 252 Ind. at 30-31, 245 N.E.2d at 164.
81. Application of any of these tests might be precluded if the defense attorney
states that his client is testifying because df previous errors and his testimony does not
waive them. See R. KEETON, TRIAL TECHNIQUES AND METHODS 184 (1954). A similar
statement could also be made before a cross-examination likely to lead to repetition of
the challenged testimony, to prevent risk of waiver on appeal. Even if this type of
statement were to become pro forma, it would at least indicate that the defense was
aware of the error, and an appellate court could hardly ignore this record judgment.
82. 392 U.S. 219 (1968).
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the Government can hardly demand a demonstration by the
petitioner that he would not have testified as he did if his
inadmissible confessions had not been used.3
The Court noted the natural inference that damaging testimony would
not have been made without compulsion and also emphasized the opening
statement of the defense. This statement, made prior to the erroneous
admissions, revealed plans not to have the defendant testify. Harrison,
therefore, seems to require sonme objective indication of non-compulsion
in the record. Unless the defense explains its strategy before the pro-
secution's case, it is unlikely that the state will be able to meet the burden
imposed. 4
The second method, utilized by the Indiana Supreme Court in
Greer, focuses attention on the content and "tenor" of the defendant's
testimony. It appeared to the court that since the defendant did not
attempt to qualify the previously admitted statements and the defense
attorney aided in making the testimony complete and natural, the testimony
was not compelled." This approach assumes that the motivation behind
the decision to testify will be apparent from behavior after this decision
has been mnde. This method, however, forces a tactical dilemma upon
the defense attorney. The more successful he is in making his client's
testimony sympathetic and persuasive, the more likely it is that the
testimony can be used by the state on appeal to make a previous Miranda
error harmless.
A middle course between the Harrison and the Greer methods is
suggested by Goodloe v. State.86 The basic question in Goodloe was
whether the defendant's testimony after a Miranda violation would allow
the court to affirm the conviction. The court held that the error could
not be waived by subsequent attempts to mitigate is effect. In a concurring
opinion Judge DeBruler focused on the strength of the state's case absent
the confession:
Clearly, without the erroneously admitted statement of appel-
lant, the State's case-in-chief would not have been sufficient to
survive a motion for a directed verdict. When an erroneously
83. Id. at 224.
84. The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 224 (1968) ; see People
v. Reid, 233 Cal. App. 2d 163, 43 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 995 (1966),
where the defendant explained, "I just wanted the truth brought out," and the causal
connection was held broken. Id. at 175, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
85. 252 Ind. at 34, 245 N.E.2d at 166.
86. -Ind.-, 252 N.E.2d 788 (1969).
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admitted statement is an essential part of the State's case-in-
chief, it can never be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
because without it the appellant would not have had to present
a defense of any kind. The erroneous admission worked a major
change in the position of appellant."7
This rule could logically be expanded to require reversal not only when
the prosecution's case would fail to get to the jury, but also when the
amount of proper evidence, though sufficient, would not be likely to
persuade the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, only when the
state's case was convincing without the statements could the testimony
be deemed not compelled by the error.
The method suggested by Goodloe reflects most directly the realities
of compulsion to testify. If the proper evidence in the prosecution's case
is overwhelming, the additional statement of the defendant is unlikely
to affect any practical necessity that the defendant take the stand. The
stronger the independent evidence of guilt, the greater is the likelihood
that it-rather than the extra-judicial statement-induced the defendant's
choice.88 The test on appeal would appear to be whether a reasonable
defendant would have acted differently if he had been presented by the
state with a case which did not contain the illegal statements.8"
As appealing and direct as this "reasonable defense" test might be,
it would be impossible to reach conclusions under it beyond a reasonable
doubt. This method requires an appellate court to determine from a cold
record the effect of the forbidden evidence and evaluate the most rational
tactical response of the defense. While this procedure may provide some
general sense of what occurred at the trial, its terms are too far removed
from the actual events, the jury and the defendant to be sustained with
the standard of certainty required. The tactical decision to have the
defendant testify is a complex balancing of many factors, only some of
which may be evident from the record." The only method which might
provide certainty beyond a reasonable doubt would be reliance on objective
indicators and the strict burden of proof outlined in Harrison.'
87. Id. at-, 252 N.E.2d at 792.
88. In re Cline, 255 Cal. App. 2d 115, 63 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1967), cert. denied, 392
U.S. 938 (1968).
89. See People v. Alesi, 67 Cal. 2d 856, 434 P.2d 360, 64 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1967),
where the court evaluated the tactical options open to the defendant and concluded that
"[tlo assert a meaningful defense, it became incumbent upon defendant to rebut [certain]
testimony." Id. at 863, 434 P.2d at 364, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
90. KALVEN, supra note 13, at 144-48, 177-81.
91. The Harrison method also makes the eventual finding of harmless error least
predictable to the prosecutor at the time of trial and, thus, best preserves the deterrent
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The Indiana Supreme Court has found that Miranda errors can
have potentially harmless impact in two situations. 2 Both situations,
however, reflect results of tactical decisions made by defense attorneys
to request instructions or to send their clients to the stand. It is important,
therefore, that the court clarify the criteria it is using in making harmless
error decisions so that defense attorneys can make intelligent choices
with some predictability of the consequences on appeal.
MICHAEL R. FRTJEHWALD
effect of Miranda. Criminal defendants testify in their own defense in an overwhelming
majority of cases. KALvEN, supra note 13, at 144. A prosecutor might, therefore, be
encouraged to buttress his case with inadmissible statements on the likelihood that the
defendant would respond to them and enough evidence would then be available to dis-
prove compulsion under the more flexible Greer or Goodloe approaches. Under the
Harrison test, a prediction that the defendant will testify does not increase the likelihood
of harmless error because that testimony alone will not provide the requisite extrinsic
evidence of non-compulsion.
92. A third situation that presents potential for harmless Miranda errors is the ad-
mission in evidence by the prosecution of several statements of the defendant, only some
of which are invalid. This situation has not arisen as yet in reported Indiana-cases but
has been involved in several cases in California, where the following criteria have been
developed:
It must appear from the record that (1) the inadmissible statement did not
contain details significantly different from the other confessions; (2) no undue
emphasis was placed on the erroneously admitted confessions by the prosecution;
and (3) the sequence of confessions was such that there could be no implication
that the legally obtained confessions were induced by those improperly obtained.
People v. Valencia, 267 Cal. App. 2d 620, 628, 73 Cal. Rptr. 303, 308 (1968). See also
People v. Powell, 67 Cal. 2d 32, 429 P.2d 137, 59 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1967) ; People v. Jacob-
son, 63 Cal. 2d 319, 405 P.2d 555, 46 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1015
(1966).
